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Setting the Stage
One of the most controversial labor policy issues is whether strikers 
should be eligible for government transfer payments, such as unemploy 
ment compensation, public assistance, and food stamps. Under current 
policies, strikers after an extended waiting period, are eligible for 
unemployment compensation in two states (New York and Rhode Island) 
and can collect unemployment benefits in many other states under cer 
tain conditions (e.g., if a strike does not result in the employer shutting 
down operations). Railroad workers engaged in a lawful strike are also 
eligible for unemployment compensation under the federal Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act. Needy strikers may also be eligible for 
cash grants and other forms of public assistance made available by state 
and county governments.
Consider the following cases:
  In July 1971, about 38,000 workers employed by the New York 
Telephone Company went on strike. Under New York's unemployment 
insurance law, these workers were allowed to collect unemployment 
benefits after they had been on strike for eight weeks. Before the strike 
was settled in February 1972, the strikers had collected $49 million 
in benefits. The New York Telephone Company financed most of these 
benefits through payroll taxes the company subsequently paid to the state.
  In 1972, 166 workers went on strike against the Dow Chemical 
Company's Bay City, Michigan plant. Michigan's unemployment in 
surance law allows strikers to collect unemployment benefits if the 
strikers obtain, and are then laid off from, "bona fide interim jobs." 
Most of the Dow strikers obtained temporary jobs with "friendly" 
employers who, after a few days, laid off the strikers. The strikers then 
applied for, and collected, unemployment benefits for the duration of 
their strike. Michigan, like New York, raised Dow's unemployment 
insurance taxes to cover the cost of the strikers' benefits.
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  During the winter of 1977-78, about 160,000 members of the United 
Mine Workers (UMW) staged a strike against the Bituminous Coal 
Operators Association. As the strike dragged on through January and 
February, thousands of miners applied for and received food stamps. 
In West Virginia, for example, 35,000 miners collected $18 million 
in food stamps. 1 In Pennsylvania, nearly 12,000 miners received food 
stamps and 2,700 received other forms of public assistance. 2 In 1981, 
the UMW once again struck the coal operators, and once again thousands 
of miners qualified for food stamps and public assistance.
  In August 1981, 12,000 air traffic controllers launched a nation 
wide strike against their employer, the Federal Aviation Administra 
tion. President Ronald Reagan ordered the striking controllers to return 
to their jobs. When they refused to do so, the president discharged the 
controllers for conducting an illegal strike against the federal govern 
ment. Subsequently, many controllers applied for unemployment com 
pensation. Although many states denied the controllers' claims for 
benefits, several allowed them to collect.
  At midnight on July 31, 1986, the collective bargaining agreement 
between the United Steel Workers union and the USX (formerly the 
United States Steel Corporation) expired. In the face of the failure to 
negotiate a new contract, USX shut down its plants across the country 
and declared a lockout. Some states ruled that the unemployed steel- 
workers were ineligible for unemployment benefits because of their par 
ticipation in a labor dispute. Other states, however, allowed workers to 
collect benefits because of the lockout. In particular, nearly 800 steel- 
workers in Illinois and 7,500 steelworkers in Pennsylvania were allowed 
to collect unemployment compensation during their dispute with USX.
These are not isolated cases. Although comprehensive data on the 
use of public aid in strikes are lacking, it would be an easy task, using 
accounts in newspapers and periodicals as well as administrative and 
court decisions, to cite dozens of other examples. Indeed, Thieblot and 
Cowin, in a book published in 1972, predicted that the cost of public 
aid to strikers would exceed $300 million in 1973. Although that figure 
was probably an overestimate, it is known that in 1980 strikers receiv 
ed $30 million in food stamps and $5 million under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) program.
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Unfortunately, no one knows the total cost of unemployment benefits 
received by workers involved in labor disputes.
But the cost of public aid to strikers is only one issue of concern to 
policymakers and citizens. Clearly, public aid to strikers also provides 
benefits, not only to the strikers themselves but also to their families 
and, indirectly at least, to the communities in which the strikers live. 
Many strikers' families suffer great hardship during prolonged strikes, 
and the benefits associated with the alleviation of that hardship may 
be worth more than the costs. Moreover, an entire community may suffer 
as a result of a protracted strike (especially when the strikers constitute 
a significant proportion of the community's workforce), and subsidiz 
ing strikers with public funds may do much to bolster the community's 
welfare. Providing public subsidies to strikers, then, may serve an en 
tirely suitable public interest.
The extension and liberalization of various welfare programs during 
the 1960s laid the foundation for the increasing use of transfer payments 
by strikers in the 1970s. This development did not go unnoticed by the 
business community. Business interests and their allies increasingly decried 
the use of tax dollars to subsidize strikers. For example, in 1978 Richard 
L. Lesher, then president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said:
our members consider it highly inappropriate that taxpayers 
should subsidize strikers. Such subsidies are even more in 
comprehensible when beneficiaries are continuing their strike 
outside the law. ... In fact, our members continue to believe 
that taxpayers should not be required to subsidize strikers 
in any event, since their decision to cease working is volun 
tary. We believe public assistance should be available only 
to those who are out of work through no fault of their own.
In supporting the 1981 legislation that made strikers ineligible for 
food stamps, Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., N.C.), a long-time opponent 
of public aid for strikers, said,
any worker who walks off the job to go on strike has given 
up the income from that job of his own volition. A person 
making such a choice, and participating in a strike, must bear 
the consequence of his decisions without assistance from the 
taxpayers. 3
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On the other hand, unions and their allies have defended the use of 
transfer payments in strikes as a fair and even necessary use of public 
funds. In 1975, the late George Meany, then president of the AFL-CIO, 
said, "It is our position that welfare benefits should be available to 
citizens who are demonstrably in need without regard for the cause of 
that need. "4 When the Carter administration threatened to cut off food 
stamp assistance to striking coal miners in 1978, Meany said the threat 
was an "outrage, especially for an administration dedicated to protect 
ing and preserving human rights. . . . This attempt to force the miners 
to agree to an unacceptable contract by starving their wives and children 
is a vindictive act." 5
In the congressional debate over the retention of striker eligibility 
for food stamps in 1981, Senator Carl Levin (Dem., MI) said,
Elimination of striker participation in the food stamp pro 
gram will pose hardship for the poorest of strikers. . . . The 
labor laws of this country protect the right to strike. The 
workers who choose to exercise this right should not be 
singled out for denial of food stamp benefits if they other 
wise qualify under the Act and program regulation. 6
While the debate over the use of government transfer payments in 
labor disputes continues, that debate is often characterized by rhetorical 
appeals to the emotions rather than analysis of hard evidence. In the 
hope that a more informed debate can lead to better policy, this book 
seeks to present a few pieces of hard evidence. The book is organized 
around the following questions.
(1) What are our current practices, where do they come from, and 
what is their rationale?
(2) Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect 
strike activity?
(3) What is the proper policy?
Our answers to those questions are summarized as follows.
What are our current practices, where do they come from, and what 
is their rationale?
Chapters 2 through 4 address this issue. Chapters 2 and 3 examine 
unemployment insurance, and chapter 4 examines public assistance.
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To write these chapters we not only searched through libraries, but 
also talked to experts in the field. We interviewed representatives of 
the AFL-CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and U.S. 
Department of Labor. We sent a survey to the employment security 
agency in each state (and conducted follow-up telephone calls) in order 
to obtain information on state policies and court cases. In each of these 
efforts we sought views on whether and how specific provisions of 
government transfer programs influence strike activity.
This inquiry leads us to conclude that there is considerable confu 
sion surrounding the issue of striker eligibility for unemployment in 
surance benefits. First, it should be recognized that the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which established the unemployment insurance system, 
gives the states the authority to establish the rules governing claimant 
eligibility for unemployment benefits (provided the states meet certain 
minimum federal standards). Therefore, each state can determine 
whether, and under what conditions, workers unemployed because of 
a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. 7 Federal tolerance 
of state autonomy on this issue, reinforced by several key Supreme Court 
decisions, results in considerable diversity in the unemployment in 
surance eligibility rules that affect strikers.
It is widely believed, even by those with knowledge of the subject, 
that only two states, New York and Rhode Island, routinely permit 
strikers to collect unemployment benefits. Although it is true that these 
two states do allow strikers to collect benefits (in New York after an 
eight-week waiting period and in Rhode Island after a seven-week 
period), it is also true that a majority of other states allow workers 
unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits 
under certain conditions. Moreover, in these states the workers are eligi 
ble to collect benefits after the normal waiting period (usually one week), 
or virtually from the outset of a strike. While the relevant state UI pro 
visions .take many forms, the following are particularly important.
(1) In 1984, 27 states had a "stoppage-of-work" provision, whereby 
strikers collect unemployment benefits if their employer continues to 
operate at or near normal operating levels during the course of the labor 
dispute. In a sense, this provision provides insurance against a failed
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strike; if the strike fails to shut down the employer, then unemploy 
ment insurance benefits are available to the strikers.
(2) In 1984, 21 states qualified claimants for benefits if the labor 
dispute is caused by an employer lockout. For example, in the dispute 
between the USW and the USX Corporation in 1986-87, cited earlier, 
the union instructed a large number of its Pennsylvania members to report 
to work after the expiration of the national contract. When the corporation 
turned the workers away from the locked gates of its Pennsylvania steel 
mills, it became a near certainty that the state would allow the 
steel workers to collect unemployment insurance benefits.
(3) In 1984, 44 states had an "innocent bystander" provision whereby 
workers obtain unemployment insurance benefits if they are unemployed 
because of a labor dispute but are not participating in, financing, or 
directly interested in the dispute. Typically, innocent bystanders are 
employed at the struck establishment, but are not members of either 
the union or the bargaining unit that is on strike.
Of course, these rules interact. Some states have none of the provi 
sions, others have one or two, while still others have all three. Interesting 
ly, New York popularly regarded as a state with liberal policies on 
the use of unemployment benefits in labor disputes has none of the 
three policies. A New York worker engaged in a labor dispute receives 
no unemployment insurance benefits during the first eight weeks of the 
strike, irrespective of whether he is a participant or an innocent 
bystander, and irrespective of whether the employer continues to operate 
or has locked strikers out. Of course, after the eight-week waiting period, 
the New Yorker receives full UI benefits. In contrast, Rhode Island 
uses a stoppage-of-work rule. Thus in Rhode Island, a striker can col 
lect benefits after a one-week waiting period if his employer does con 
tinue to operate during a strike and can collect benefits after a seven- 
week waiting period if his employer does not continue to operate dur 
ing a strike.
It should be clear from this brief preview that the rules governing 
the payment of unemployment benefits in labor disputes are complex 
and diverse. The variation in the rules across states means that strikers 
who are otherwise identical may be eligible to collect benefits in one 
state but not in another. Some states, particularly those with work-
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stoppage, lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Georgia, 
Maryland, West Virginia, are relatively liberal in qualifying workers 
for benefits. Other states, particularly those without work-stoppage, 
lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Alabama and North 
Carolina, are quite strict. By providing a thorough understanding of 
the "rules of the game," chapters 2 and 3 lay the foundation for our 
subsequent empirical analyses of the effect of variation in the rules on 
strike activity.
Chapter 4 deals with the eligibility of strikers for AFDC-U benefits, 
food stamps, and general assistance. For nearly 20 years, opponents 
of federal assistance to strikers had struggled to remove striker eligibility 
for AFDC-U and food stamps from the law, but without success. When 
Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, however, the stage was set 
for Congress to enact a package of sweeping budget cuts. On July 31, 
1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 
which cut federal expenditures by $35 billion. The Act brought about 
major policy changes in many domestic programs, including AFDC, 
Medicaid, food stamps, job training, and others. 8 Elimination of striker 
eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps were only two of the many 
policy changes incorporated in the OBRA.
Because Congress eliminated striker eligibility for AFDC-U and food 
stamps in 1981, the material covered in chapter 4 is primarily historical 
in nature. Yet the issue of whether strikers should be eligible for welfare 
benefits continues to be relevant, particularly because in 1986 a federal 
district court ruled that the provision in the 1981 law that denies food 
stamps to the families of strikers violates due process and interferes 
with the striker's First Amendment right of freedom of association. 9 
Although the Supreme Court reversed this decision in 1988, thereby 
ending legal challenges to the OBRA, the issue will continue to be the 
subject of congressional debate on public policy. 10 But in deciding on 
which transfer policies, if any, should be used in labor disputes, it is 
necessary to understand how the federal welfare system operated in the 
1960s and 1970s, when strikers could qualify for assistance. Moreover, 
because the data gathered for our empirical analysis cover the period 
1960-75, we are able to make an assessment of the effect of striker
8 Setting the Stage
eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps on the frequency and duration 
of strikes.
Until 1961, the AFDC program targeted families with children where 
the father was absent and the mother did not work. In 1961 Congress 
extended coverage under the program to dependent children in 
households with an unemployed father. States were given the option 
of deciding whether to participate in the AFDC-U program and by 1967, 
21 had decided to do so. 11 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the pay 
ment of AFDC-U benefits to strikers remained a contentious issue, with 
controversy centering upon whether a striker fell within the definition 
of an unemployed parent. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Batterton 
v. Frances, ruled that this definitional decision should be left to the states. 
Thus, the issue of whether states participating in the AFDC-U program 
could deny benefits to strikers' families was finally settled. By 1980, 
of the 26 states participating in the AFDC-U programs, 8 had chosen 
to deny benefits to strikers.
AFDC-U benefits were never an important source of income sup 
port for strikers. This is in part because, as noted above, many states 
either did not have an AFDC-U program or denied benefits to strikers. 
In addition, even if a participating state did permit strikers to collect 
benefits, a striker could only qualify if he met the same federal and 
state eligibility requirements imposed on all other applicants for 
assistance. The most salient requirements were that he was unemployed 
for at least 30 days, that he have a dependent child, that he could 
demonstrate financial need under his state's resource and income tests, 
and that he did not receive unemployment insurance benefits. In com 
bination, these requirements always seriously limited the number of 
strikers eligible for AFDC-U. For example, since the average strike 
in the United States lasts about three weeks, the 30-day waiting period 
by itself prevented most strikers from ever becoming eligible for AFDC-U 
benefits.
Food stamps were a somewhat different story. The food stamp pro 
gram is funded entirely by the federal government but is administered 
jointly by the federal government and the states under uniform federal 
standards. It is clear that during the 1960s and 1970s many more strikers 
qualified for food stamps than for AFDC-U. First, unlike the AFDC-U
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program, all states participated in the food stamp program. Second, 
there is no waiting period for food stamp benefits. Third, the resource 
and income tests used to qualify applicants for food stamps have been 
more liberal than those used in most state AFDC programs. Fourth, 
after 1970 the Food Stamp Act specifically provided that otherwise eligi 
ble strikers would not-be disqualified from receiving food stamps.
Strikers may also benefit from the General Assistance program. 
General Assistance is distinguished from AFDC-U and food stamps by 
an absence of federal involvement. It is funded and administered by 
state and local governments; in some states eligibility rules differ from 
county to county. Since it is a very old program, there are instances 
where strikers have received General Assistance throughout the 20th 
century. Indeed, since the program was not touched by the 1981 OBRA 
legislation, strikers can still receive General Assistance. In most states, 
however, this is a small program that provides minuscule benefits to 
people with the lowest of family incomes. To choose an extreme ex 
ample, in August, 1974, Alabama provided General Assistance benefits 
of $12.50 to 42 people. While we have no hard numbers, it is unlikely 
that many strikers benefit from this program.
Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect strike 
activity?
This question is not merely "academic." It has arisen in the most 
practical of settings. For example, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, a case 
involving the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers in 
Rhode Island, the first circuit court demanded an empirical burden of 
proof. The court said:
[The] present record suffers from a fundamental defect. It 
provides no support for a causal relationship between the 
receipt of benefits, which unions obviously desire and often 
actively seek, and longer, costlier strikes. . . . [The] record 
lacks even a crude form of what we assume would be the 
most relevant and probative type of evidence statistical com 
parisons of the length and cost of strikes in states granting 
unemployment benefits (Rhode Island and New York) and 
the length and cost of strikes of similar size in similar in 
dustries in other states not granting such benefits. 12
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Similarly, in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, a case involving payment 
of AFDC-U benefits to strikers, the first circuit court called for evidence 
indicating,
. . . how many states permit strikers to receive welfare; 
whether or not strikes tend to be of longer duration where 
welfare is received; and studies or expert testimony evaluating 
the impact of eligibility for benefits on the strikers' resolve. 13
There exist but a handful of studies that examine the relationship be 
tween transfer payments and strike activity. Perhaps best known is a 
work by Thieblot and Cowin, which is primarily based on case studies. 14 
A study of Great Britain by Gennard similarly relies on description, 
case studies, and gross cost estimates. 15 John Kennan 16 applies modern 
statistical methods in examining the relationship between unemploy 
ment insurance and the duration of strikes. His work, however, focuses 
on the New York and Rhode Island policy of providing UI benefits in 
very long strikes, and thereby ignores the multitude of other policies 
under which strikers receive government transfers. 17
A distinguishing feature of the present work is that it uses modern 
statistical methods in an analysis of a broad range of government policies. 
Chapter 5 introduces the relevant theory, the hypotheses to be tested, 
the methods, and the data. Chapter 6 presents quantitative results and 
draws conclusions.
Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of theory. Theory is crucial to this 
project because it provides a bridge between the institutional details in 
chapters 2-A and the quantitative results in chapter 6. Chapters 2-4 essen 
tially tell us that in certain circumstances workers involved in strikes 
obtain government transfers. Theory addresses the question of whether 
there is a logical basis for arguing that these transfers affect strike ac 
tivity. Much past work has treated this as a simple question that can 
be glided over in one or two sentences. In our view, that is a serious 
mistake for two reasons.
First, the answer is not at all obvious. Payment of government transfers 
to strikers will surely make it easier for workers to support themselves 
during a strike. But why would that result in more strike activity? The 
employer is presumably aware of the availability of such transfers. If
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government transfers strengthen the bargaining position of the union, 
then one might expect a rational employer to be more willing to settle 
without a strike, or, failing that, settle sooner rather than later. That 
means less strike activity. The point is that a concept of what starts and 
stops strikes necessarily underlies any claim that government transfers 
increase strike activity. That concept deserves critical examination; it 
should not be left between the lines.
The second reason for exploring theoretical issues is that empirical 
work always raises questions that are best answered with a theory. What 
explanatory variables should be included in an analysis of strike activi 
ty? What is the appropriate dependent variable? What are the key 
hypotheses? What is the proper interpretation of a result? Empirical 
work always requires answers to such questions. Theory helps to make 
the answers logically consistent and explicit rather than implicit.
Thus, chapter 5 opens with a review of theories. On the basis of this 
discussion it is clear that there is no general consensus on the "right" 
theory of strikes. Rather, there are competing and often contradictory 
theories. Fortunately, for our purposes a general theory of strike ac 
tivity is not requisite. We only need a theory that links transfer policies 
to strike activity. That theory was found in the work of Melvin Reder 
and George Neumann. The fundamental proposition of the theory is 
that strike activity is a decreasing function of the combined (union plus 
management) cost of strikes. As the potential cost of a strike increases, 
according to Reder and Neumann, the parties have a greater incentive 
to develop protocols that allow them to reach peaceful settlements. From 
this theory we derive a series of hypotheses linking specific provisions 
of unemployment insurance and welfare programs to strike activity.
Those hypotheses can be tested with state level data. Transfer policies 
affecting strikers usually vary across but not within states. If transfer 
policies affect strike behavior, then that should be revealed through dif 
ferences in the "average" level of strike activity across states. In con 
sequence, we collected data on several dimensions of strike activity for 
the 50 states over the period 1960-1974. We also collected data on the 
specifics of state transfer policies ("stoppage-of-work," "innocent 
bystander," etc.) for the same period. Chapter 5 closes with a discus-
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sion of the nuances of data sources, variable measurement, and statistical 
methodology.
Chapter 6 then presents results from a sequence of regression analyses 
on annual cross-sections and on the full (1960-1974) panel. On the basis 
of the statistical evidence, we conclude that there is a link between the 
unemployment insurance system and strike activity. A more generous 
unemployment insurance program is related to a higher strike frequen 
cy in states that use "innocent bystander" or "stoppage-of-work" dis 
qualification rules. Similar results were not obtained for other unemploy 
ment insurance provisions, e.g., the New York-Rhode Island waiting 
period, or other dimensions of strike activity, e.g., average duration 
of strikes. Finally, our statistical models did not uncover evidence linking 
welfare programs to strike activity. Either such a link is nonexistent 
or our methods are insufficiently precise to discern it.
What is the proper policy?
When should government transfers be provided to workers engaged 
in strikes? As discussed in chapter 7, at the heart of this question lies 
a philosophical problem concerning the appropriate role of the modern 
state in what are usually two distinct spheres: government transfers and 
industrial relations. The answer necessarily involves finding a balance 
between what are often conflicting policy goals in the two spheres. For 
example, a goal like government neutrality in labor relations comes in 
conflict with the goal of alleviating hardship and distress. Thus, the 
chapter begins with an examination of current policy goals and tradeoffs 
between those goals.
Chapter 7 ends with the authors' position on the proper policy. Briefly 
stated, in our opinion the present system is seriously flawed. It denies 
public assistance benefits to the family of a law-abiding striker irrespec 
tive of hardship. It provides unemployment insurance benefits to strikers 
when the involuntary nature of their unemployment is fraught with am 
biguity. It places part of the burden of financing strike related transfers 
on the larger society, and thereby increases the level of strike activity. 
Chapter 7 proposes a package of alternative policies that are oriented 
toward the twin goals of alleviating hardship and promoting industrial 
peace.
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